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Abstract  
Relations between the British government and the BBC are often fraught at times of armed 
conflict, particularly in the absence of national consensus. A pattern of pressure on, and 
intimidation of, the BBC underlies efforts by successive governments to set the agenda for 
reporting 'in the national interest'. The effects of such pressure is considerable and, some claim, 
has led to over-dependence on official and 'establishment' sources in the BBC's coverage of 
conflicts. Such over-dependence, it could be argued, is typified by the 'flagship' current affairs 
series Panorama which has been accused by current affairs practitioners and media analysts of 
generally reflecting a 'Westminster consensus'.  
This paper examines Panorama's coverage of the invasion of Iraq to explore claims that Britain's 
longest-running current affairs series largely reflects 'elite opinion'. Textual and content analysis 
of an archive of Panorama programmes related to the war is used to examine the charge that 
Panorama draws on a limited range of 'establishment' views and perspectives in its war coverage, 
whilst marginalising more critical opinions and explanations. 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper on the BBC current affairs series Panorama’s coverage of the Iraq war 
forms part of research by Bournemouth University’s Centre for Broadcasting 
History into an archive of videos from the series broadcast between 1987-2004. 
This period was a politically volatile one for the BBC, beginning with the sacking 
of one Director General, Alasdair Milne, under Conservative government pressure 
and ending with the resignation (effectively a sacking) of another, Greg Dyke, 
under Labour government pressure. The wider research identifies a number of 
factors shaping Panorama’s evolving representation of stories and issues during the 
period. These include: changes in the public service broadcasting environment; 
regulatory mechanisms and institutional constraints; competition from other news 
and current affairs programmes; and the legacy of particular management regimes 
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and personnel within BBC in general, and Panorama in particular. The focus of this 
paper, however, is to assess the possible impact on Panorama’s coverage of the Iraq 
War of two other factors considered significant in critical accounts of the period: 
the government’s relationship with the BBC, and journalistic culture and practices 
at the Corporation’s News and Current Affairs Department. 
 
 
Journalistic culture and practice 
Journalistic training, practice and ethics vary considerably around the world. 
Concepts of ‘objectivity’ or ‘neutrality’, for instance, have traditionally been prized 
more highly in broadcast journalism from the UK than from Germany. Lucy 
Küng-Shankelman makes this point in her comparative study of broadcasting 
organisations: 
 
‘British journalists exhibit fewer scruples than their German counterparts 
about ‘creative’ methods of gathering information, such as paying 
informants or pretending to be someone else. Whereas German journalists 
see their primary role as drawing attention to potential dangers or threats 
and communicating their personal interpretation of events,  their UK peers 
feel their professional role is to report neutrally on events, even ones they 
privately judge as alarming.’ (Küng-Shankelman, 2000, 62) 
 
Critics of British broadcast journalism assert that simplistic notions of ‘neutrality’ 
underpinning news and current affairs make it easier for governments, or powerful 
elites, to manage and manipulate media coverage because of reporters’ reliance on 
‘official sources’, ‘experts’, and ‘mainstream’ representatives of the political and 
business world to provide contrasting points of views on any given subject (see 
Negrine 1989; Miller 1993; McQueen 1998; Allan, 1999). Accusations that over-
reliance on official sources distorts news and current affairs output towards the 
viewpoint of ruling interests go back to the work of the Glasgow University Media 
Group in the 1970s and beyond, with many examples drawn from the BBC’s own 
coverage (see Eldridge, 1995). 
 
Critical accounts of the BBC’s news and current affairs output have frequently 
noted the Corporation’s tendency towards a ‘mandarin-like’ conception of 
journalism which stresses the disinterested mediation of information, a cautious, 
defensive ‘rhetoric of constitutionalism’ and the so-called ‘impartial’ umpiring of 
differences of ‘legitimated opinion’ (Born, 2005.). This tendency is exacerbated, it 
is said, by entrenched elitism in the News and Current Affairs Department, a 
defining characteristic that remains almost untouched by recruitment policies that 
have attempted to widen the social and ethnic background of BBC staff generally. 
The accusation has been partly acknowledged by senior figures within the BBC. 
Director General Greg Dyke admitted in a BBC Radio Scotland interview in 2001 
that the BBC remained ‘hideously white’ (BBC, 2001) and was in need of widening 
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 its recruitment base to reflect the diverse interests and perspectives of the nation. 
Richard Sambrook, Director of BBC News during the Iraq War, relates this 
problem to his department’s output and describes BBC audience research which 
indicated deep dissatisfaction with the perspectives offered: 
 
There is a new political divide: no longer ‘left’ and ‘right’ – it’s now ‘us’ and 
‘them’, with ‘them’ being politicians, the establishment and the broadcasters 
and media. (Sambrook, 2002. p 19-20)  
 
This concern, while not new, is now widespread at the BBC (Graham, 2004; Marr, 
2004) and Panorama’s recent move towards shorter more populist topics (see 
Gaber, 2008) may reflect a strategic attempt to win back mainstream audiences 
which had been effectively written off as unreachable by previous schedulers and 
Panorama editors. Notions of ‘impartiality’ are moving away from ‘soundbites in precise 
celestial balance’ towards: 
 
‘[…] an openness of mind and approach that ensures fairness and 
proportionality to a range of views.’  
(Sambrook, 2004) 
 
 
The Government and the BBC  
 
It is one of the great hypocrisies of British public life […] that the BBC is 
independent of government control.  
(Harris, 2004) 
 
Accounts of the British government’s relationship with the BBC written within the 
critical tradition of Media and Communication Studies have stressed the corrosive 
effect of government influence and pressure, either direct or indirect, on the 
Corporation’s public service broadcasting values and journalistic independence, 
particularly in times of conflict. 
 
Roger Bolton former editor of Panorama (editor of This Week during Death on the 
Rock) expressed the issue succinctly: 
 
‘The BBC either is independent, or it isn’t.  
(Bolton, 1997) 
 
According to Bolton’s clear-cut standard (and based on his own experience 
working in current affairs) the BBC is, demonstrably, not ‘independent’. It could 
be argued, in opposition to Bolton, that the Corporation has, on occasion, 
broadcast material that has infuriated the government, indicating some degree of 
autonomy. However, this level of autonomy is dismissed as a ‘very short leash’ in 
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the most critical accounts (see Edwards and Cromwell, 2006).   This highly 
sceptical view of the BBC’s independence is at least partly supported by the work 
of media scholars and historians who have catalogued government interference 
and pressure on the BBC from every administration since the Corporation’s 
earliest days, as well as formal and informal ‘ties’ of various kinds – including the 
appointment of The Board of Governors responsible for ‘deposing’ Milne and 
Dyke (see Miller, 1994; Barnett, S. And Curry A., 1994; Abercrombie, 1996; 
Rawnsley, 1996; Philo, 2002).  
 
Roger Bolton was the Panorama Editor behind some of the investigations that 
particularly angered Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. The first, a 
Panorama programme made in Northern Ireland but never broadcast, included 
footage of an IRA roadblock in the village of Carrickmore and led to the seizure of 
film under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In Parliament Mrs. Thatcher called on 
the BBC to 'put its house in order'. As Miller notes: 
 
The legacy of the Carrickmore affair, 1979 assassination of Airey Neave, and 
the 1984 Brighton bombing (in which Mrs Thatcher herself narrowly 
escaped death), coupled with the major rows over the Falklands [particularly 
a Panorama report  ‘Can We Avoid War?’] and the coverage of the miners 
strike in 1984/85, sets the context for government relations with the 
broadcasters.   
(Miller, 1994. pg.35-36) 
 
Roger Bolton was sacked over the issue on the orders of the Board of Governors, 
but was later re-instated. It is also claimed by Alasdair Milne that another Panorama 
investigation – ‘Maggie’s Militant Tendency’ - into alleged links between the 
Conservative party and racist right wing political groups contributed to his sacking 
as BBC Director General, the first in the Corporation’s history (see Snoddy, 2006). 
 
In fact, despite assertions of the Corporation’s independence, the BBC itself has 
carefully documented a long history of ‘pressure’ from the British government 
which goes back as far as the General Strike of 1926 which underlines the 
compromises sometimes made to maintain its funding and ‘independence’ (‘The 
BBC Under Pressure’ BBC, 2006). Notable examples described in the same 
overview of the Corporation’s clashes with British governments during its history 
include ‘The Suez Crisis’ (1956); David Dimbleby’s documentary on Harold 
Wilson ‘Yesterday’s Men’ (1971); the Panorama investigations around the so-called 
‘Carrickmore Incident’ (1979) and the Falklands Conflict (1982); Real Lives (1985); 
The Libyan Bombing (1986); The Zircon Affair (1986-87) and, finally, what is 
introduced as ‘the most damaging row’ - Iraq, Gilligan and Hutton (2003).  
 
These accounts are, in some respects, an unusually honest admission by the BBC 
that the relationship between the British government and the Corporation is one 
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 frequently defined by struggle at times of national conflict. This struggle is at its 
sharpest when the British public is divided on the issue, as the accounts of Suez 
and the Falklands War make clear.  
 
A recurring challenge for the BBC is its stance when the country goes to 
war. In World War 2 its programmes and journalism had reflected a nation 
squarely behind the struggle against the Nazi threat. But the question is less 
clear cut when the nation itself is divided over the decision to mobilise. The 
Falklands War in 1982 was a case in point, as was Suez 26 years earlier.  
(BBC 2006, 7) 
 
Richard Lindley a former Panorama reporter argues that at times of armed conflict, 
disputes with the government of the day are to be expected: 
 
 ‘[…] when the BBC takes an independent view on something the 
government is quite jumpy about, then the situation quickly turns nasty.’ 
 (Lindley 2003) 
 
Over the Iraq War, British public opinion was very divided and there was an 
awareness amongst senior BBC managers, even before the first shot was fired, that 
relations were likely to get very ‘nasty’ between the Corporation and the 
government (Dyke, 2004). It is important to note however that no Panorama 
journalist has yet admitted that government pressure had any effect on their 
coverage of the war. John Ware’s view that ‘flak’ only made journalists more 
careful about accuracy, but did not affect the substance of any investigation, was 
typical of opinion sampled on this issue (interviewed February 2007). Post-Hutton 
however, one Panorama journalist has admitted to this researcher, but only ‘off-
record’(!), that there was a distinct chilling effect on investigative reporting for a 
period, a view supported by the author of Flat Earth News, Nick Davies at 
Westminster University’s Investigative Journalism Conference (2008). 
 
 
Panorama and Iraq 
The issues of ‘information management’ and government ‘pressure’ on the BBC 
twinned with concerns about a BBC culture of ‘shared political assumptions’ and 
uncritical over-reliance on ‘official’ sources frame many of the debates around the 
Corporation’s handling of the Iraq War. A question raised by research into 
coverage of the run up to, invasion and continuing occupation of Iraq was the 
extent to which Panorama conformed to models of conflict coverage within the 
critical tradition, including those by Hallin (1989), Chomsky (1994), Bennett 
(1999), Altheide and Grimes (2005) and others. Altheide and Grimes’ model of 
‘War Programming’, for instance, describes a pattern of war reporting that includes 
the demonising of certain individual leaders, such as Slobodan Milosevic or 
Saddam Hussein, in the pre-war phase; a focus on the battle front during the war; 
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and a post-war shift to more critical coverage on the conduct and questions on the 
necessity of the war. 
 
According to this model the mass media play an integral part in the support of 
conflict. The mass media do not ‘start’ the war, but they do shape the context, the 
audience expectations, the discourse and the ‘production of symbolic meanings’. 
War Programming is therefore a ‘package’ in which propaganda is effectively 
joined to the news process. This occurs because journalists and news sources 
operate with ‘media logic’, share in the government or military’s construction and 
emotional performance of events and limit the public forums for debate, especially 
dissent. 
 
For Altheide and Grimes this is a picture of communication control that cannot be 
corrected by changing individual reporters, passing new codes of ethics, or revising 
the journalism curriculum. They are features of an ‘ecology of communication’. 
 
Studying Panorama’s coverage of the Iraq War can help determine how far such a 
critical model applies to the world’s longest running current affairs programme and 
to what extent the BBC’s ‘flagship’ series exhibits the features of an ‘ecology of 
communication’ as identified above. Running since November 1953, and covering 
all the major events of that long period of recent British history, Panorama has 
always had to represent the BBC on matters of national importance. Its flagship 
status has meant investigations have, historically, had a bigger impact than similar 
investigations by Newsnight or Channel 4 News, for instance, where a daily slot and 
the sheer volume of output has protected these programmes from serious charges 
of bias or partiality.  As already mentioned, Panorama has also been the cause of a 
number of serious disputes between the BBC and several governments over its 
history which partly explains the ‘Pride and Paranoia’ title of Richard Lindley’s 
inside account of the series. The programme’s special, somewhat anxious status 
was explained to me by Newsnight journalist Michael Crick, formerly a Panorama 
reporter. 
 
M.C. You always got the sense that it was a highly political programme and 
that the BBC was constantly worried about Panorama in a way that it doesn’t 
seem to give a toss about other programmes like Newsnight and we get away 
with things on Newsnight that you’d never get away with in a million years on 
Panorama.  
 
D.M. That’s curious because they are both described as ‘flagships’. Why is 
that? 
 
M.C. Yes I know, it’s an historical thing, Panorama certainly used to have this 
kind of status. If Panorama said it, it was sort of holy writ, I mean you 
couldn’t make jokes on Panorama. [..] 
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In light of previous clashes over its war coverage and mindful of the programme’s 
potential impact on the BBC’s relationship to the government and the wider public 
Panorama journalists and producers approached the topic with some caution. 
Bound by the BBC’s statutory duty to provide ‘impartial’ and ‘balanced’ news and 
current affairs coverage, reporting proved especially difficult to meet to everyone’s 
satisfaction in the case of the Iraq war because the opposing positions were so far 
apart and so entrenched. The BBC and Panorama were accused of being, on the 
one hand, anti-war, if not pro-Saddam. One US journalist at the time described the 
BBC as the ‘Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation’ (Sullivan, 2004). They were also 
accused by some who were opposed to the war as being slavishly uncritical and of 
being cowed by a hostile government who were muttering threats about the license 
fee and their charter, (the threat was, allegedly, made directly by Tessa Jowell 
according to Panorama reporter John Ware).  For some critics the charge extended 
to BBC News and Current Affairs effectively legitimising the war through the 
systematic exclusion of dissenting voices (Edwards and Cromwell, 2006). Charges 
of bias by either side were vigorously denied by those working in the wider 
industry (Tait, 2004.), the BBC (Sambrook, 2004) and Panorama (Simpson, 2003), 
specifically.  
 
Is there evidence of ‘bias’ or the ‘exclusion of voices’ in Panorama’s coverage of the 
war? An examination of the actual titles of the thirty programmes that deal with 
the topic of Iraq since 2000 reveals a sense of how the invasion and occupation 
unfolded as a series of debates about the justification for war, the conduct of the 
war and the aftermath of the war. A focus on personalities (‘Saddam’, ‘Blair’ or 
‘Bush’) is apparent in the titles of ten of thirty of the programmes, such as: 
‘Saddam - A Warning from History’, or ‘Blair’s War’. There are also an unusual 
number of programmes with audience participation in them – interactive specials, 
national and international audience debates which reflect one Panorama strategy for 
dealing with public and establishment divisions around the subject. The qualitative, 
textual analysis of the broadcast material that follows below is supported by a small 
quantitative study which sets out to determine an objective measure of Panorama 
airtime allocated to the range of views that existed in relation to the war. 
 
 
Pre-War 
A key aspect of the framing of the Iraq war was the use of fear. This was evident 
from the earliest Panorama report which dealt with Iraq, ‘Bin Laden’s Bomb’ 
(transmitted in October 2001) which made a link (later shown to be false) between 
the Iraq regime and Al Qaida operatives. The introduction sets the scene   
 
TOM MANGOLD:  The fear is as old as history.  The plague doctor of the 
middle ages helpless in the continent where disease killed millions.  Today 
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the images have returned and with them the fear that disease may walk the 
land once more. 
 
Evidence brought forward in this programme of meetings between the 9-11 
plotter and Iraqi officials has subsequently been denied by the CIA and widely 
discredited, but in 2001 it is presented in Tom Mangold’s report as fact: 
 
MANGOLD:  […]  The reason we know the terrorist and the Iraqi spy met 
here at Prague Airport on at least one occasion is because they were 
photographed together by the  Czech Security Services on the day that Atta 
flew to the United States.  But what was Mohamed Atta plotting, and why 
did he have to come so far out of his way just to meet the man who was 
Saddam Hussein's station chief in Prague? 
 
JIM WOOLSEY 
Director, CIA, 1993-95 
It looks extremely suspicious and I doubt very seriously if Mr Atta was in 
that lovely city of Prague as a tourist and just happened to chance upon an 
Iraqi intelligence officer as his tour guide on two occasions, and I also, I 
rather doubt that his interest in crop dusting was at that point because he 
was interested in a second career.  He knew he had no second career.  Those 
are both extremely suspicious acts on his part. 
 
While the programme only dealt with the ‘threat’ from Iraq in part, no counter-
arguments were set forward to cast doubt on the link between Saddam’s regime 
and Al Qaida. An examination of transcripts shows that the use of senior former 
or serving US and UK government, military and intelligence agency staff is a 
defining feature of Panorama investigations in coverage of the lead up to and 
subsequent invasion of Iraq. This over-reliance on ‘official sources’ has been noted 
as characteristic of mainstream media’s coverage of conflict by a number of studies 
( Herman and Chomsky 1994, Hoskins 2004, Andersen 2006) and in the case of  
Panorama’s investigative reporting was certainly not balanced by giving airtime to 
senior figures from the anti-war movement who were exposing flaws and 
falsehoods in these arguments. 
 
In September and November 2002 two Panorama programmes were made about 
Iraq that produced evidence broadly supportive of the government’s hard-line 
strategy. The first of these ‘The Case Against Saddam’ used old Panorama 
investigations of the Iraqi regime to build its case alongside information from a 
government dossier which was yet to be released to parliament. This suggests that 
government or intelligence services cooperated extensively with Panorama in the 
making of the programme, a view supported by statements within the programme, 
by Jane Corbin, such as ‘The CIA believes Saddam is up to his old tricks’. Corbin’s 
conclusion at the end of the programme is indicative of the evidence presented: 
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CORBIN: The dilemma is that if politicians do not act, Saddam will 
continue down the nuclear path.  But if he’s attacked, then he may use his 
chemical or biological agents.  The hawks are clear where America’s interests 
lie. Well, if containment has failed with Saddam Hussein, what message does 
that send to other states seeking weapons of mass destruction about the 
attitude America will take towards them? 
 
PERLE: Well, I hope it sends the message that if you pursue weapons of 
mass destruction and if you are a threat to the United States, we will not 
stand by and allow you to achieve your objectives. 
 
CORBIN: The Bush administration has put Saddam and the rest of the 
world on notice. This is a new era. Time for Saddam Hussein is running out. 
 
The interview with the hawkish Richard Perle was one of five appearances in 
separate Panorama episodes in which he laid out the neo-conservative strategy (a 
total of 1,593 words).  
 
Corbin’s concluding remarks make three assumptions based on this ‘evidence’: 
firstly, that the ‘Saddam’s regime’ had an active and potentially threatening nuclear 
programme, secondly, that it was in possession of chemical or biological agents 
and thirdly that ‘containment’ has failed to prevent Saddam Hussein developing 
these weapons. As Scott Ritter and other former weapons inspectors not 
interviewed by Jane Corbin had argued, none of these assumptions were correct. 
The coding of pro- or anti-war statements and views aired by Panorama in this 
study exclude any comment by the presenters or journalists (coded simply as (7) 
reporter’s comment), but any assumptions about the ‘objectivity’ or ‘neutrality’ of 
such comments need to be set aside. 
 
The second Panorama investigation ‘Saddam: A Warning from History’ in 
November 2002 was described by one media watchdog as ‘all but indistinguishable 
from government propaganda’ (MediaLens, 2002). The programme used 
intelligence sources, the accounts of Iraqi defectors and graphic close up footage 
of Iranian victims of Iraqi poison gas attacks and bloated bodies of women and 
children at Halabja to ‘draw lessons from Saddam Hussein’s past conduct in order to discover 
what he is likely to do now’. Media Lens wrote to John Simpson to ask: 
 
‘Why he failed to interview, or represent the views, of even one person such 
as the former weapons inspector Scott Ritter who has reported that the Iraqi 
regime cooperated in delivering fully 90-95% disarmament of its weapons of 
mass destruction by December 1998, that any remaining biological weapons 
would be useless sludge, that attempts to reconstitute a WMD programme 
would be immediately detectable to western technology.’ 
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They asked why he used just sixteen words to comment on Western responsibility 
for the ‘one million Iraqis civilian deaths’ as a result of sanctions. Media Lens also 
quoted from a Guardian article written in 2001 that implied that John Simpson had 
paid a career price for critical reporting in a Panorama investigation in the lead-up 
to the Falkland’s War indicating that UK foreign policy had invited the invasion. 
They suggested that he had learnt his lesson and had rebuilt his career by toeing a 
more cautious ‘establishment’ line. This prompted a furious response by John 
Simpson and it is very revealing of journalists’ attitudes to such charges to read the 
exchange in full on the Media Lens website and compare Simpson’s defence with 
his own account of his demotion in his book Strange Places, Questionable People (1999, 
258-59). 
 
Until December 2002 Panorama had mainly relied on official US and British 
government spokespersons, Iraqi dissidents and intelligence sources for the 
‘evidence’ of its investigations. As Miller (1994) notes: 
 
‘Journalists continue to mistake authority and status for credibility and are 
orientated towards the state in their work practices and their reportage. 
However, the extent to which the state or the government comes in for 
criticism from the media is variable.  It depends among other things on the 
balance of political forces at any time.  If the government is weak or divided 
then it will be easier for journalists to criticise and for the broadcasters to 
resist pressure and intimidation’ 
(p.277) 
 
If Panorama’s investigations had so far been, in effect, ‘pro-war’ the next 
investigation was clearly framed to address the perceived imbalance. ‘The Case 
Against War’ transmitted in December 2002 interviewed several opponents of the 
war. This was, in a sense, less a Panorama investigation than a chance for figures 
opposed to the war to express their doubts. They included Major General Patrick 
Cordingley (Commander 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91); Haifa Zangana, an Iraqi 
exile tortured by the regime, but still opposed to war; Robert Baer a former CIA 
agent who worried about destabilizing the region; Sir Andrew Green – former 
Ambassador to Syria and Saudi Arabia; Jessica Stern (former presidential advisor 
on the National Security Council); Chuck Hagel (Republican Foreign Relations 
Committee) a right wing senator and Vietnam veteran who called for more debate; 
Bishop of Oxford Rt. Rev. Richard Harries who said: ‘I don’t think the traditional 
‘just war’ criteria have been met’. Tony Benn, President of the Stop the War 
Coalition which organized huge demonstrations, is ‘interviewed’ for just 10 
seconds compared to several minutes of airtime for each of the other contributors. 
 
The programme dealt mainly with nuances of opposition within the establishment 
– not the full argument of the anti-war movement. Arguments were largely around 
the notion that the threat had not reached a level where a war was fully justified, 
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 rather than arguments that the war was completely unjustified, criminal and 
immoral. 
 
As the story moved to the preparation for invasion, and with conflict more likely 
with each passing month, the focus increasingly shifted to justification for the 
coming war. Panorama programmes made in this period, particularly phone-ins and 
live audience debates (‘Panorama Interactive Special’, 29th September 2002 and 
‘Bush versus Saddam’, 2nd March 2003) reflect the deep split in public opinion on 
such a justification. These programmes may have been seen by the BBC as an 
opportunity to redress the balance towards allowing more dissenting voices which 
had, until this point, been outweighed in the programme’s investigative reporting 
by pro-war arguments (34.6% pro-war or partially pro-war comments, against 
25.6% anti-war or partially anti-war comments, according to this study. 
 
 
Invasion Phase 
‘Blair’s War’ perhaps gives the anti-war movement its best opportunity for making 
the case against invasion. However, the programme was broadcast on the 23rd  
March when British and American troops were already deep into Iraqi territory 
and, to some extent, the arguments had been superseded by events. The film was, 
in fact, made in the run up to the biggest march in Britain’s history and in it 
Panorama goes ‘to the heart’ of the Stop the War Coalition and contrasts it with 
Blair’s rallying call for support. Screening the programme at all at this time might 
have been regarded as a ‘risk’ for the BBC given the furious government reaction 
to Panorama’s ‘Can We Avoid War?’ (1982), when the Falkland’s ‘task force’ was at 
sea. Perhaps significantly then, Panorama’s focus is not on, arguably, the most 
articulate leading anti-war figures such as Tariq Ali, George Galloway or Tony 
Benn but rather with the unlikely supporters from ‘middle England’ attracted to 
the march. Vivien White interviews a novelist, former army Major and a 
professional female Labour supporter who works for a Birmingham think tank. 
There are brief appearances by anti-war organizers who are introduced with 
something of a ‘health warning’: Lindsay German: ’a long-serving member of the 
Socialist Workers Party’ and Andrew Murray: ‘a communist’.  Andrew Murray was 
filmed for a week and interviewed many times but only says 129 words in the 
programme compared to 462 words by Tony Blair or 721 words by Jack Straw. We 
do not hear any of Lindsay German’s arguments and only 24 words by The Stop 
the War President, Tony Benn, widely regarded as one of Britain’s most eloquent 
speakers (see Marr, 2004). 
 
By April 27th, more than two weeks after the fall of Baghdad, a Panorama report 
entitled ‘The Battle for Basra’ was transmitted with Jane Corbin focusing on the 
British occupation of the southern city. Corbin is ‘embedded’ with British troops 
although her report does include some critical assessment of the progress of the 
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war amongst material favourable to the occupying forces. There is some insight 
into the effects of civilian casualties, for instance, when Corbin interviews the 
victims of a British airstrike that was targeting Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali 
Hassan al-Majid, nicknamed ‘Chemical Ali’. The strike killed several members of a 
respected, English-educated doctor’s family. The survivors are able to tell their tale 
in fluent English and show photographs of the children and adults who were 
killed. Corbin explores the power vacuum in Basra and looks at how the troops are 
asked to do a ‘difficult job’ winning a ‘hearts and minds campaign’ with few 
resources. There is no water, electricity, fuel, or backup administration, for 
instance. 
 
Jane Corbin is embedded with British troops in Basra for the report. The process 
and effect of embedding journalists has raised many questions about the possibility 
of balance and impartiality.  Corbin offers no criticism of the occupying forces and 
the language employed, including the comparison with Nazi Germany, suggest her 
loyalties are with British forces she accompanies: 
 
CORBIN:  The imam of a local mosque however can't run a city the size of 
Basra.  The Ba'ath Party dominated almost every aspect of life here as the 
Nazis once did in Germany.  It will prove almost impossible to root the 
Ba'ath out completely. The problem is, how do you know who the good 
guys are and the bad guys?  That's a real problem for you surely? 
 
McSPORRAN:  It is but what we're doing is we're deferring to the people 
that we can identify and particularly as with this gentleman's own case, the 
sort of religious leaders who the locals obviously respect, we found very 
quickly in the small villages on the outskirts of town that the key Ba'athist 
members, the people who've been responsible for enforcing the regime were 
indicated to us straightaway.   
 
CORBIN:  So people here know who the bad guys are. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes, they do very much so. 
 
CORBIN:  The bad guys were still very much in evidence on the streets of 
Basra as the Irish Guard were finding on their nightly patrols.  These young 
soldiers with experience of Northern Ireland reckoned that some criminal 
elements were seizing their opportunity as the regime released its grip on 
Basra.  But Sergeant Perry suspected that some of the gunmen were one 
time members of Saddam's militias seeking to prolong the anarchy.   
 
Ba’ath party members may have had a reputation amongst local Shiites as the ‘bad 
guys’ especially given the party’s record in Basra, but the simplistic label ‘good guys 
and bad guys’ is questionable language, to say the least, for a journalist to use 
whilst reporting with an occupying army.  
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 In April another Panorama examined possible problems with the invasion strategy, 
including the doubts of former military figures that the coalition had enough 
troops to take Baghdad. John Ware puts some of the doubts raised to the Minister 
of Defence Geoff Hoon including this question: 
 
WARE: The Americans have bombed the information ministry.  Yet, 
although its signal has sometimes been shaky, Iraqi TV is still on the air. Do 
you think it was a mistake not to have taken Iraqi TV off the air straight 
away? 
 
GEOFF HOON MP 
Secretary of State for Defence 
What we were trying to achieve in this campaign was both military success 
but also to leave as much of the infrastructure of the country in place as 
possible.  
 
WARE: But the TV is a central part of the Saddam regime, isn't it? 
 
HOON: Certainly it has been used for propaganda reasons.  It's been used 
to support the military resistance.  It is part of the regime, and certainly I 
have consistently complained about the way in which Saddam's propaganda 
has been rebroadcast not least in the Arab world but even in the western 
world. 
 
This is a remarkable line of questioning for a journalist to ask a Defence Minister 
and raises important ethical questions about the role of journalists at times of war 
and their responsibilities to abide by International Conventions protecting civilians 
from deliberate attack, even when their governments do not.  It is also worth 
asking whether British journalist’s unions cover this type of issue in their codes of 
practice and, if so, to what extent it is enforced. 
 
As in the pre-invasion phase there is some evidence that Panorama’s investigative 
reporting favoured pro-war voices against anti-war voices during the invasion 
period. Coding of statements made in pre-edited Panorama programmes (not live 
debates and phone-ins) shows that 48.2% of statements were pro- or partially pro-
war; against 40.4% anti- or partially anti-war. Many of the ‘partially anti-war’ 
statements cast doubt on the effectiveness of particular tactics rather than arguing 
against the legitimacy of the war itself – a position rarely found after ‘Blair’s War’, 
recorded at the height of the anti-war movement, but transmitted after the 
invasion phase had begun. Interestingly, statements coded as ‘neutral’ fell from 
30.6% before the invasion to just 11.1% and anti-coalition Iraqi forces statements 
fell from 9.3% to just 0.3% between the pre-invasion and invasion phase. 
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Post-war Period 
It is after the end of official hostilities (declared on the 1st May 2003) that we see 
far more critical investigative journalism begin to emerge. ‘The War Party’ is the 
first of these transmitted on the 18th  of May, but mainly recorded during the 
invasion. The programme exposes the aims and ambitions of the so called ‘neo-
conservatives’ in Washington, especially those behind the Project for a New 
American Century. It does this through extensive interviews with ‘neo-cons’ and 
their opponents. In fact, a coding of the programme reveals that 68% of the views 
aired were pro- or partially pro-war, with only 23% given to opponents of the war 
and the neo-con agenda. However, the neo-conservative position is framed 
critically in the report with their views shown to be deeply influential, extreme and 
potentially dangerous. This strongly suggests that coding can only be of limited 
value in assessing overall degrees of partiality to given views. A more nuanced and 
contextual close reading is more useful at teasing out framing strategies and the 
‘positioning’ of the Panorama audience. In the following excerpt we see how 
interviews with leading neo-cons are used to clarify their position and present a 
sense of the possible threat they present to peace in the Middle East and the wider 
world: 
 
BRADSHAW:  How did you feel when the statue came down? 
 
WILLIAM KRISTOL 
Project for the New American Century 
Moved. It was a moving moment really.  Great to see. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Looks like you won.  What next? 
 
KRISTOL:  Well, I think we need to help get Iraq on its feet and help 
establish a decent government there, and then really work to remove other 
dictators with weapons of mass destruction and deal with the threat of 
terrorism around the world, but hopefully not with military action, hopefully 
through diplomatic pressure, but this is the end to the beginning of this 
broader war, it's not the end of the end. 
 
KRISTOL:  [addressing public] :  This was a very important moment I think 
in all honesty in American history this last 3-4 weeks.  After Vietnam many 
Americans came to think that we couldn't be a force for good in the world, 
that our military …. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Much of the world peers into the New American Century 
with anxiety.  Neo-conservatives hope we'll rally round their faith in 
American power.  They may not win every battle, George Bush may yet find 
them a liability.  But his ideological shock troops are on a roll.  Bad news if 
you're in the way. 
 
McQueen, BBC’s Panorama… 
 
 
61
 
 Kristol’s contributions is coded as pro-war but the reporter’s (Bradshaw’s) line of 
questioning and narration frame the neo-con position problematically ‘[…] his 
ideological shock troops are on a roll.  Bad news if you're in the way’. 
 
Another four months pass in the post-invasion phase before the next Panorama 
during which time the initial euphoria of ‘liberation’ (shown in some invasion-
phase programmes) seems to have worn off. In ‘The Price of Victory’ Panorama 
reporter Andy Davies spends six months with the American 427 field artillery 
nickname ‘Thunder Battalion’ from March 2003 – August 2003. ‘The Price of 
Victory’ traces the progress of the occupation over the period. It shows how initial 
cautious support  for the troops from many of those Iraqis grateful to see the back 
of Saddam, quickly soured as the army was forced into a peacekeeping and law 
enforcing role for which it was not equipped. Andy Davies’ report shows the 
frustration of Iraqis as months into the occupation there is still no water, electricity 
or law and order – the provision of which is a legal duty for any occupying power.  
 
We are also shown how violence flares up as a result of poor decision making by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). For example, as large denomination 
notes lose their value because of falling confidence in the old bank notes, the CPA 
decides to allow Iraqis to exchange these for smaller denomination notes. But 
instead of using a network of banks they distribute them through a handful of 
offices. Consequently there are huge queues outside these offices in the heat of the 
summer. The US troops have to police these and we see the patience of the 
waiting crowd and troops snap and the Panorama crew films a group of soldiers 
beating and abusing the angry crowd. Later a protestor is shot dead in a 
demonstration by former Iraqi soldiers who have not been paid for months. Andy 
Davies interviews the family of the dead man who we see in dignified grief. They 
say they want justice, either the man who killed their brother must be punished 
and blood money paid. If not his brother swears to kill four soldiers for every one 
they have killed. 
 
Some aspects of the report are possibly affected by the embedding process such as 
the generally positive representation of most US soldiers who are shown to be 
doing their best against difficult circumstances. Examples of ignorance, racism or 
‘trigger-happiness’ that have been common allegations against occupying troops 
are only hinted at, as in an extraordinary brutal sequence which appears to show a 
‘drive by’ shooting of an innocent civilian accompanied by the following 
understated narration: 
 
A group of American soldiers had just taken a hit on one of their vehicles 
and they decided to hit back with another overwhelming show of force.  But 
this was a busy shopping district and in the confusion the soldiers opened 
fire on a group of onlookers. 
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There are also, as with ‘The Battle for Basra’ interviews with Iraqis supportive of 
the invasion. However, Andy Davies is also able to leave the battalion to report on 
the appalling conditions in local hospitals and (over the six months) show the 
rapidly deteriorating security condition. Consequently, there is a sense here in 
which an investigative reporter has given a more ‘balanced’ and sophisticated view 
of events on the ground than in previous Panorama reports that relied more heavily 
on official and uncritical sources, or gave a more ‘embedded’ view. 
 
‘The Price of Victory’ is typical of many of the Panorama investigations in the post-
invasion phase that look at difficulties with the occupation and cast doubts on the 
necessity of the war (as predicted by the War Programming model). These include 
‘Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons’; ‘A Fight to the Death’ – John Ware’s critical 
account of both the government and the BBC’s conduct over the Gilligan affair; 
‘Shamed’ Jane Corbin’s damning investigation into the Abu Graib scandal; ‘A 
Failure of Intelligence’ (July, 2004) or ‘Iraq, Tony and the Truth’ (March, 2005) - 
Ware’s own reports on the ‘thin’ and ‘exaggerated’ intelligence that took Britain to 
war; ‘Troops Out?’ (October, 2005) a debate on the anti-war arguments for 
withdrawing troops and ‘A Good Kicking’ (March, 2007) on the beating and 
torture of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers.  
 
Programmes in the post-invasion period still contained statements partly 
supportive of the invasion although they are almost always tempered by criticism 
of the conduct of the occupation. Reporter John Simpson’s observations at the 
end of ‘Exit Strategy’ (January, 2005) following the elections suggest that while 
deeply flawed, the occupation can bring about some benefit to the Iraqi nation 
with his own prediction of the long-term outcome: 
 
SIMPSON: A lot of Iraqis must have reflected today that these elections 
would have been far more peaceful if only the Coalition had agreed to hold 
them before the Sunnis were so alienated and the insurgency grew so strong.  
I don’t think it ever occurred to me in all the years I've been coming to 
Baghdad, that the first time Iraqis were able to cast their votes in a free and 
fair election that it would be in an atmosphere like this, half empty streets 
and the noise of explosions every now and then, and a general sense of 
anxiety and fear.  But I do think it's important not to assume from what's 
happening today that the entire process is bound to fail, in fact on the 
contrary I think it's bound to succeed. It's just that it's been so badly 
botched along the way by so many people.  
 
Nevertheless, pro- or partially pro-war statements and arguments are found in far 
fewer proportions amongst Panorama programmes transmitted after George Bush 
declared an end of major hostilities. 
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 Conclusion 
Panorama is not a monolithic entity. In fact, speaking to former Panorama journalists 
– one of the criticisms of the programme is that reporters work in separate teams. 
Michael Crick who now works for Newsnight said: 
 
‘I mean on Newsnight everyone sort of gets on with each other as far as I 
can tell. You know everyone’s sort of cooperative, whereas on Panorama 
there was almost a sort of quiet glee if somebody else did a programme that 
wasn’t very good.’ 
 
Consequently, the type of investigations that get made can be quite different from 
each other with journalists and producers following up their particular interests. 
Nevertheless, some quite consistent patterns emerge from a study of Panorama’s 
coverage of the war that tie in with some models and frameworks of 
understanding developed by critical media theory. 
 
Panorama’s pre-war coverage was neither overwhelmingly pro-war nor anti-war. 
The BBC’s legal obligation to provide ‘balance’ can, at one level, be found in the 
range of opinions found in the programmes transmitted, particularly if live debates 
and phone-ins are included. This partly supports Tumber and Palmer’s (2004) 
study of the Iraq War which shows a high degree of scepticism in the run up to the 
war in sections of the media. As Hallin (1989) argues, the way the media reports 
events is closely tied to the degree of consensus among the political elite or the 
‘sphere of consensus’ as he labels it and such a consensus was not apparent in the 
same way that it was in previous conflict, such as over Afghanistan or Yugoslavia. 
Panorama was able to respond to the strains in the foreign policy elite by producing 
far higher amounts of critical coverage without abandoning ‘objective journalism’ 
for some dissident or anti-establishment conception of their role. 
 
However, the question of ‘balance’ in the pre-war phase is not so easily answered. 
Simple quantitative analysis, for example, cannot clearly account for the ‘quality’ or 
types of arguments excluded, or the context for arguments put forward. 
Examination of (post-war) ‘The War Party’ shows there is no easy correlation 
between the number of pro- or anti-war statements and the overall framing of the 
programme, a process which evades simple categorisation of this kind. Chronology 
also needs factoring in to any assessment of balance in the pre-war phase. 
Programmes in the early pre-war phase were generally supportive of a pro-war 
viewpoint, while anti-war voices were heard more clearly as war approached. The 
crucial period for influencing public opinion in order to prevent war may well have 
passed by the time British troops were being sent to the region. 
 
This study of Panorama’s coverage of the Iraq conflict generally supports theories 
of source behaviour which are used in critical studies to explain how the media can 
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‘support’ a war without abandoning their ‘objectivity’ in a technical sense.  Media-
government relations are explained by Bennett’s (1990) ‘indexing hypothesis’: 
 
Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to 
index the range of voices and both news and editorials according to the 
range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given 
topic. (1990)  
 
According to the hypothesis, non-official sources only appear in news stories when 
their opinions are already emerging in official circles. When institutional 
opposition collapses, even if public opinion is opposed to a particular policy, the 
volume of opposition in news and editorials is indexed accordingly. Hence, as the 
war began the media reduced access to anti-war voices, or they were reported at a 
distance. Only ‘organisationally endowed claims makers’ got consistent access once 
hostilities began. This view was partly confirmed by this study, although ‘Blair’s 
War’ and a live debate ‘Questions from a Divided World’ transmitted in the early 
stages of the war offered an opportunity for a range of dissenting voices as well as 
pro-war voices to be heard. The contents of ‘Questions from a Divided World’ 
and ‘After Saddam’ supports the ‘War Programming’ model’s prediction of 
coverage in wartime as dealing with ‘international reaction and anticipation of the 
war’s aftermath’. ‘The Battle for Basra’ and ‘The Race to Baghdad’ confirm the 
model’s prediction of ‘coverage of the current war […] to capture the various 
aspects of the battle front, the home front [and] the media coverage’. 
 
Jonathan Mermin’s (1996) elaboration of Bennett’s indexing theory suggests the 
media are able to claim they are fulfilling journalistic ideals of balance and 
objectivity when a conflict is underway by switching to presenting and analysing 
the ability of the government to achieve the goals it has set. Reporters offer critical 
analysis inside the terms of the apparently settled policy debate. In the case of 
Panorama’s coverage this was articulated along strategic questions such as: Can the 
coalition forces capture Baghdad with the relatively small number of forces they 
have? Shouldn’t the coalition forces have taken out the Ba’athist dominated 
television station? Do they have enough men to maintain control after the fall of 
Saddam’s regime? 
 
This study lends support to the view that it is in the ‘post-war’ phase that ‘critical’ 
investigative journalism is most likely to take place and confirms the pattern of 
coverage anticipated by the ‘War Programming’ model. Why should this be? Did 
the media operate as ‘co-conspirators’ in the preparation for war? The evidence of 
this study suggests a more complicated process at work.  
 
While government pressure on the BBC was certainly a daily reality in the lead up 
to and execution of the invasion, there is less evidence that such pressure directly 
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 influenced Panorama journalists. It certainly made individual reporters more careful 
in checking facts that might embarrass the government, but testimony from 
current and former Panorama staff suggests that investigating government claims 
on WMD or the case for war was never discouraged at senior levels. The chilling 
effect of the Hutton Inquiry on the BBC may have tempered investigations for a 
time in the post-war period, but as we have seen it is in this period that the most 
critical material on the war is produced.  
 
Was ‘journalistic culture and practice’ at fault for allowing government claims 
about the Iraqi regime to go relatively uncontested until just four months before 
war? Certainly the social composition of Panorama’s managerial infrastructure and 
its programme makers supports the view that ‘those in charge of mass 
communication tend to share similar backgrounds to those in control of economic 
and social systems’ (Johnstone et al. in McQuail, 1987). The charges of ‘elitism’, or 
of an ‘Oxbridge’ bias may partly account for the restricted level of debate that 
Lindsay German complains of - and awareness of this problem at the BBC, 
documented above, may account for the opportunities (albeit belated and limited 
ones) given to proponents of an anti-war view to make their case. It seems likely 
that divided popular opinion, audience pressure and the widely publicised mass 
protest, had its part to play in encouraging attention to the wider debate at the 
BBC in this respect. 
 
Serious flaws in the government’s claims about WMD were well known in advance 
of March 2003, and while some of these views were reported, they received 
relatively late attention from Panorama investigators. ‘Experts’ representing views 
wholly opposed to war and contrary to dominant discourse, such as former UN 
inspector Scott Ritter, former UN Humanitarian Coordinators for Iraq Hans von 
Sponeck and Dennis Halliday, leading US intellectual Noam Chomsky or other 
leading anti-war activists went largely unrepresented. While Panorama’s coverage 
was not uniform, the majority of criticism and reflection followed major military 
action, rather than preceding it as expected with the War Programming conception 
of war coverage. 
 
Research by Chouliaraki (2005) on news coverage of the Iraq war is in line with 
findings from this study, that journalists and media organizations do not 
consciously abandon ‘impartiality’ as a guiding principle at times of war or co-
ordinate behind-the-scenes with the government to persuade the public of a point 
of view. Rather, that it is the more routine aspects of journalistic practice and 
editorial policy (see Allan, 1999), particularly reliance on official sources, the use of 
news frames and dominant thematic emphases to structure the selection, 
presentation and emphasis of reports, which help explain the under-representation 
of dissenting and anti-war voices, particularly in the lead up to war. 
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In conclusion, this study of Panorama’s coverage of the Iraq war reveals a degree of 
professional autonomy at play, producing differing accounts of the justification, 
conduct and consequences of the war. These accounts served, on the one hand, as 
a conduit for unreliable ‘intelligence information’ to the public and, for a particular 
period, excluded expert and activist opinion opposed to the war. However, as war 
drew closer, oppositional views grew louder. The BBC’s reliance on political elite 
discourse permitted the considerable disquiet with, and (partial) opposition to, US 
and UK foreign policy to be expressed by a variety of establishment and (to a 
much lesser extent) non-establishment actors. This disquiet continued, albeit 
muted, throughout the war and then grew as coalition control of Iraq broke down 
in the post-invasion phase. The study partly confirms a number of theories of war 
reporting and media-state relations, including Altheide and Grimes’ (2005) ‘War 
Programming’ model; Bennett’s (1999) ‘indexing hypothesis’ and empirical studies 
that show predominantly ‘supportive’ coverage by the broadcast media at times of 
war particularly in relation to how: 
 
‘[…] dependence on government sources is understood to play a central role 
in shaping  journalist’s perceptions of events.’  
(Goddard et al. 2007) 
 
These findings, however, suggest that while the well-documented government 
intimidation of the BBC during this period may have impressed a need for 
‘caution’ during investigations liable to embarrass the government’s position, that 
other factors are more likely to have shaped the Panorama team’s coverage, 
particularly the journalistic culture and practices operating more widely within the 
BBC’s News and Current Affairs Department. It can be no surprise after all, that a 
major cultural institution such as the BBC is ‘tied’ to the structure of power that 
funds its existence. Showing the mechanisms through which this power operates 
within a single current affairs series is a multi-layered task that requires 
understanding of complex interconnections between state pressures and 
institutional constraints, through managerial and editorial decision-making 
processes and right down to the level of individual human agency. Making sense of 
these interconnection in relations to Panorama’s output will be the focus of further 
research at Bournemouth’s Centre for Broadcasting History. 
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